The problem of moral luck arises due to a particular tension in our thought. On the one hand, we seem readily inclined to endorse the principle that moral responsibility, that is, one’s praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, cannot be affected by luck, that is, by factors over which one lacks control. But, when we examine our actual practices, we find that our moral judgments are highly sensitive to luck. This resulting tension between principle and practice is the problem of moral luck, and (...) an attempt to solve this problem is an attempt to resolve this tension. The article first explains the traditional characterization of the problem and reviews three general strategies in responding to it. It is then argued that we should characterize the problem in a slightly broader way. This refocusing turns out to have significant methodological implications. (shrink)

Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that "once blameworthy, always blameworthy." They believe that blameworthiness is like diamonds: it is forever. We argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness for past action is completely divorced from (...) the distinctive psychological features of the person at the later time. This is because on none of the leading accounts of personal identity does identity require the preservation of any distinctive psychological features, but merely requires some form of continuity. The claim that blameworthiness is forever should therefore be rejected. We then sketch an account of blameworthiness over time, and consider two objections. (shrink)

Many theorists have found the notion of forgiveness to be paradoxical, for it is thought that only the blameworthy can be appropriately forgiven but that the blameworthy are appropriately blamed not forgiven. Some have appealed to the notion of repentance to resolve this tension. But others have objected that such a response is explanatorily inadequate in the sense that it merely stipulates and names a solution leaving the transformative power of repentance unexplained. Worse still, others have objected that such a (...) response cannot succeed because no amount of repentance can render the blameworthy not blameworthy. I argue that this latter objection is based on a mistaken assumption, the acknowledgement of which has the power to resolve the paradox in a way that meets the explanatory adequacy challenge, and, more generally, has significant implications with which any full theory of forgiveness must engage. (shrink)

Building on Peter French’s important work, this chapter draws three distinctions that arise in the context of attributions of moral responsibility, understood as the extent to which an agent is blameworthy or praiseworthy. First, the subject of an attribution of responsibility may be an individual agent or a collective agent. Second, the object of the responsibility attribution may be an individual action (or consequence) or a collective action (or consequence). The third distinction concerns the temporal dimension of the responsibility attribution. (...) Sometimes responsibility for an action is attributed to an agent at the time of the action. At other times responsibility for an action is attributed to an agent sometime after the action has taken place. Taken together, these three binary distinctions yield eight types of responsibility attribution. It is argued that a collective agent’s responsibility for a past collective act is properly understood on the same theoretical model as is an individual’s responsibility for a past individual act. While most assume that responsibility over time is a straightforward matter of identity over time, it is argued that instead this is a matter of psychological or attitudinal connectedness. The possibility is considered that this relation also grounds attributions involving an asymmetry between subject and object, such as individual responsibility for past collective action, but a skeptical worry is raised that such attributions entail an unpalatable form of moral luck and should therefore be rejected. (shrink)

Despite a large and multifaceted effort to understand the vast landscape of phenotypic data, their current form inhibits productive data analysis. The lack of a community-wide, consensus-based, human- and machine-interpretable language for describing phenotypes and their genomic and environmental contexts is perhaps the most pressing scientific bottleneck to integration across many key fields in biology, including genomics, systems biology, development, medicine, evolution, ecology, and systematics. Here we survey the current phenomics landscape, including data resources and handling, and the progress that (...) has been made to accurately capture relevant data descriptions for phenotypes. We present an example of the kind of integration across domains that computable phenotypes would enable, and we call upon the broader biology community, publishers, and relevant funding agencies to support efforts to surmount today's data barriers and facilitate analytical reproducibility. (shrink)

Aristotle is essentially human; that is, for all possible worlds metaphysically consistent with our own, if Aristotle exists, then he is human. This is a claim about the essential property of an object. The claim that objects have essential properties has been hotly disputed, but for present purposes, we can bracket that issue. In this essay, we are interested, rather, in the question of whether properties themselves have essential properties (or features) for their existence. We call those who suppose they (...) do “property essentialists”; those who do not, “property anti-essentialists,” or “quidditists.” We offer two complementary arguments. Our total argument is under-girded by two assumptions: transworld identity theory and “received view” counterfactual semantics, a la David Lewis. We then argue that, if one presumes that these are true, then one risks running headlong into paradox if one also accepts property anti-essentialism. That's the first argument. By contrast, if one accepts these same assumptions in conjunction with property essentialism, then the paradox is avoided. This is the second argument. We take it that our arguments work to show that, between property essentialism and quidditism, the property essentialist is on better footing. Plausibly, properties themselves do have essential properties for their existence. (shrink)

Since Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), historians and philosophers of science have paid increasing attention to the implications of disciplinarity. In this chapter we consider restrictions posed to interdisciplinary exchange between ecology and economics that result from a particular kind of commitment to the ideal of disciplinary purity, that is, that each discipline is defined by an appropriate, unique set of objects, methods, theories, and aims. We argue that, when it comes to the objects of study in (...) ecology and economics, ideas of disciplinary purity have been underwritten by the artificial-natural distinction. We then problematize this distinction, and thus disciplinary purity, both conceptually and empirically. Conceptually, the distinction is no longer tenable. Empirically, recent interdisciplinary research has shown the epistemological and policy-oriented benefits of dealing with models which explicitly link anthropogenic (i.e., “artificial”) and non-anthropogenic factors (i.e., “natural”). We conclude that, in the current age of the Anthropocene, it is to be expected that without interdisciplinary exchange, ecology and economics may relinquish global relevance because the distinct and separate systems to which each “pure” science was originally made to apply will only diminish over time. (shrink)

Warning: includes two somewhat graphic images. This paper is an effort to lay out a taxomony of conceptual relations between the domains of the sublime and the religious. -/- .

An often-overlooked characteristic of the human mind is its propensity to wander. Despite growing interest in the science of mind-wandering, most studies operationalize mind-wandering by its task-unrelated contents. But these contents may be orthogonal to the processes that determine how thoughts unfold over time, remaining stable or wandering from one topic to another. In this chapter, we emphasize the importance of incorporating such processes into current definitions of mind-wandering, and propose that mind-wandering and other forms of spontaneous thought (such as (...) dreaming and creativity) are mental states that arise and transition relatively freely due to an absence of constraints on cognition. We review existing psychological, philosophical and neuroscientific research on spontaneous thought through the lens of this framework, and call for additional research into the dynamic properties of the mind and brain. (shrink)

It has been hypothesized that our believing that, or its seeming to us as though, the world is in some way dynamical partially explains (and perhaps rationalizes) future-bias. Recent work has, in turn, found a correlation between future-bias and near-bias, suggesting that there is a common explanation for both. Call the claim that what partially explains our being both future- and near-biased is our believing/it seeming to us as though the world is dynamical, the dynamical explanation. We empirically test two (...) versions of the dynamical explanation. The first is the moving ego explanation—according to which it is our belief that the ego moves, or our phenomenology as of the ego moving, that jointly (partially) explains future- and near-bias. The second is the moving time explanation—according to which it is our belief that time robustly passes, or our phenomenology as of robust passage, which jointly (partially) explain future- and near-bias. We found no evidence in favour of either explanation. (shrink)

In 2016, a multidisciplinary body of scholars within the International Commission on Stratigraphy—the Anthropocene Working Group—recommended that the world officially recognize the Anthropocene as a new geological epoch. The most contested claim about the Anthropocene, that humans are a major geological and environmental force on par with natural forces, has proven to be a hotbed for discussion well beyond the science of geology. One reason for this is that it compels many natural and social scientists to confront problems and systems (...) that transgress traditional disciplinary boundaries, and as a result, calls for interdisciplinary research are now gaining traction. Proponents of such transgressions have dubbed the new scientific order that will result “Anthropocene Science”, and rhetoric notwithstanding, such discussions exemplify how recent changes within science justify rethinking a prevailing image of how science is done, and with it, the working relationship between scholars in the humanities, natural scientists, and social scientists. (shrink)

1. A multidisciplinary group of scholars within the International Commission on Stratigraphy – known as the Anthropocene Working Group – recently recommended the Anthropocene as a new geological ep...

Review of Wesley Salmon's Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.

This paper empirically investigates one aspect of the folk concept of time by testing how the presence or absence of directedness impacts judgements about whether there is time in a world. Experiment 1 found that dynamists, showed significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in dynamically directed worlds than in non-dynamical non-directed worlds. Comparing our results to those we describe in Latham et al., we report that while ~ 70% of dynamists say there is time in B-theory worlds, (...) only ~ 45% say there is time in C-theory worlds. Thus, while the presence of directedness makes dynamists more inclined to say there is time in a world, a substantial subpopulation of dynamists judge that there is time in non-directed worlds. By contrast, a majority of non-dynamists judged that there was time in both growing block worlds and C-theory worlds, with no significant differences between the means. Experiment 2 found that when participants are only presented with non-dynamical worlds—namely, a directed world and a non-directed world—they report significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in B-theory worlds. However, the majority of participants still judge that there is time in C-theory worlds. We conclude that while the presence of directedness bolsters judgements that there is time, most people do not judge it to be necessary for time. (shrink)

Recent research (Latham, Miller and Norton, forthcoming) reveals that a majority of people represent actual time as dynamical. But do they, as suggested by McTaggart and Gödel, represent time as essentially dynamical? This paper distinguishes three interrelated questions. We ask (a) whether the folk representation of time is sensitive or insensitive: i.e., does what satisfies the folk representation of time in counterfactual worlds depend on what satisfies it actually—sensitive—or does is not depend on what satisfies it actually—insensitive, and (b) do (...) those who represent actual time as dynamical, represent time in all possible worlds as dynamical—what we call insensitive dynamism—or do they represent time in all possible worlds as dynamical only conditional on the actual world in fact being dynamical—what we call sensitive dynamism and (c) do dynamists and non-dynamists deploy two different representations of time, or deploy the same representation, but disagree about what actually satisfies that representation? We found no evidence that the folk representation of time is sensitive, or that the folk representation of time is essentially dynamical in either sense, though we did find evidence of a shared representation, on which dynamical features are sufficient, but not necessary, for time. (shrink)

We submit this brief in support of the Nonhuman Rights Project’s efforts to secure habeas corpus relief for the elephant named Happy. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, declined to grant habeas corpus relief and order Happy’s transfer to an elephant sanctuary, relying, in part, on previous decisions that denied habeas relief for the NhRP’s chimpanzee clients, Kiko and Tommy. Those decisions use incompatible conceptions of ‘person’ which, when properly understood, are either philosophically inadequate or, in fact, compatible with Happy’s personhood.

Many philosophers hold that ‘one-instant worlds’—worlds that contain a single instant—fail to contain time. We experimentally investigate whether these worlds satisfy the folk concept of time. We found that ~50% of participants hold that there is time in such worlds. We argue that this suggests one of two possibilities. First, the population disagree about whether at least one of the A-, B-, or C-series is necessary for time, with there being a substantial sub-population for whom the presence of neither an (...) A-, B-, nor C-series, is necessary for time, and hence those folk have a radically more minimal concept of time than has been attributed to them by philosophers. Or, second, the population do not disagree about whether at least one of the A-, B-, or C-series is necessary for time, but disagree about what it takes for a world to fail to contain even a C-series. (shrink)

Gruber and Smith (2019) have conducted some interesting virtual reality (VR) experiments, but we think that these experiments fail to illuminate why people think that the present is special. Their experiments attempted to test a suggestion by Hartle (2005) that with VR one might construct scenarios in which people experience the same present twice. If that’s possible, then it could give us a reason to think that when we experience the present as being special, that’s not because it’s objectively so. (...) Instead, our experience of the present being special is a feature of having a psychology like ours. While we are sympathetic to the thought that there is no objective present, we do not think that these experiments give us a reason to think this. That said, VR experiments, such as Gruber and Smith’s, hold much promise for being able to illuminate various aspects of our temporal psychology.According to Hartle’s (2005) IGUS model (which is meant to resemble entities like us) sensory information is routed to two kinds of processes: conscious processes C, which cause behavior, and unconscious processes, U, which construct a schematic representation of the environment. Hartle proposed that we experience the present as being special because of the sensory information at a time entering into C. For Gruber et al. (2020), the succession of sensory information entering into C underpins our experience of time passing. Our experience of time passing is illusory because it fails to be verid... (shrink)

The essays in this volume explore those aspects of Kant’s writings which concern issues in the philosophy of mind. These issues are central to any understanding of Kant’s critical philosophy and they bear upon contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. Fourteen specially written essays address such questions as: What role does mental processing play in Kant’s account of intuition? What kinds of empirical models can be given of these operations? In what sense, and in what ways, are intuitions object-dependent? (...) How should we understand the nature of the imagination? What is inner sense, and what does it mean to say that time is the form of inner sense? Can we cognize ourselves through inner sense? How do we self-ascribe our beliefs and what role does self-consciousness play in our judgments? Is the will involved in judging? What kind of knowledge can we have of the self ? And what kind of knowledge of the self does Kant proscribe? These essays showcase the depth of Kant’s writings in the philosophy of mind, and the centrality of those writings to his wider philosophical project. Moreover, they show the continued relevance of Kant’s writings to contemporary debates about the nature of mind and self. Contents: 0. Introduction Anil Gomes and Andrew Stephenson 1. Kant, The Philosophy Of Mind, And Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy Anil Gomes 2. Synthesis And Binding Lucy Allais 3. Understanding Non-Conceptual Representation Of Objects: Empirical Models Of Sensibility’s Operation Katherine Dunlop 4. Are Kantian Intuitions Object-Dependent? Stefanie Grüne 5. Intuition And Presence Colin McLear 6. Imagination And Inner Intuition Andrew Stephenson 7. Inner Sense And Time Ralf M. Bader 8. Can’t Kant Cognize Himself? Or, A Problem For (Almost) Every Interpretation Of The Refutation Of Idealism Andrew Chignell 9. A Kantian Critique Of Transparency Patricia Kitcher 10. Judging For Reasons: On Kant And The Modalities Of Judgment Jessica Leech 11. Kant On Judging And The Will Jill Vance Buroker 12. Self and Selves Ralph C. S. Walker 13. Subjects Of Kant’s First Paralogism Tobias Rosefeldt 14. The Lessons Of Kant’s Paralogisms Paul Snowdon. (shrink)

This paper investigates the connection between temporal attitudes (attitudes characterised by a concern (or lack thereof) about future and past events), beliefs about temporal ontology (beliefs about the existence of future and past events) and temporal preferences (preferences regarding where in time events are located). Our aim is to probe the connection between these preferences, attitudes, and beliefs, in order to better evaluate the normative status of these preferences. We investigate the hypothesis that there is a three-way association between (a) (...) being present-biased (that is, preferring that positive events are located in the present, and negative events are located in the non-present), (b) believing that past and future events do not exist and (c) tending to have present-focused rather than non-present-focused temporal attitudes. We find no such association. This suggests that insofar as temporal preferences and temporal attitudes are connected to the ways we represent time, they are not connected to the ways we represent temporal ontology; rather, they are more likely connected to the ways we represent relative movement in, or of, time. This has important consequences for, first, explaining why we exhibit these preferences and, second, for their normative evaluation. (shrink)

Debates about the genuine disease status of controversial diseases rely on intuitions about a range of factors. Adopting tools from experimental philosophy, this paper explores some of the factors that influence judgments about whether low sexual desire should be considered a disease and whether it should be medically treated. Drawing in part on some assumptions underpinning a divide in the literature between viewing low sexual desire as a genuine disease and seeing it as improperly medicalized, we investigate whether health and (...) disease judgments are affected by factors such as an individual’s gender, the cause of the low desire, whether the desire is high or low, and both personal and societal valuations of the condition. Our main findings indicate that (a) the cause of a condition influences whether it is judged a disorder, (b) how the individual values the condition influences whether the condition is seen as a proper target of medical intervention, and (c) perceived dysfunction influences judgments regarding health, disorder classification, medicalization, and medical intervention. Our findings help further illuminate the intricate interplay of factors that influence judgments about health and disease in controversial conditions. (shrink)

Review of Wesley C. Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.

Causal contextualism holds that sentences of the form ‘c causes e’ have context-sensitive truth-conditions. We consider four arguments invoked by Jonathan Schaffer in favor of this view. First, he argues that his brand of contextualism helps solve puzzles about transitivity. Second, he contends that how one describes the relata of the causal relation sometimes affects the truth of one’s claim. Third, Schaffer invokes the phenomenon of contrastive focus to conclude that causal statements implicitly designate salient alternatives to the cause and (...) effect. Fourth, he claims that the appropriateness of a causal statement depends on what is contextually taken for granted or made salient. We show that causal invariantism can explain these linguistic data at least as well as contextualism. We then argue that pace Schaffer, some causal sentences are always correct and can never be plausibly denied, regardless of the context. (shrink)

This study which utilized the critical analysis, analyzed Wittgenstein’s concept of language-game and its implications in philosophical discipline and contemporary society. To delineate the origin of the problem of language in terms of epistemological dimension, the researcher analyzed the related concepts on classical philosophy. To determine the origin of the concept of language-game, the researcher used the historical method. To constructively criticize the end-goal of language-game, the hermeneutical approach of Hans Georg Gadamer was employed. From the findings and with the (...) aid of the above-mentioned methods, the researcher had come up with these conclusions. Language is inalienable in the sociological nature of man. Man is always related or connected to the other. In this sense, man shares his very subjectivity with the other. Unless he realizes this, he cannot actualize the essential part of his nature. In every aspect of man’s life, it is imperative for him to negotiate, communicate, and collaborate with the members of his household and society. Wittgenstein is the one of the philosophers who gave deeper commitment and emphasis on the concerns of language in man’s life. Mastering our use of language is not just for the sake of conventional understanding, but, more importantly, we use it in its proper context in order to express our thoughts clearly and in the process to understand ourselves. It is because, as we speak or write using language as medium of communication, we are projecting ourselves to the other. If we come up with the c common understanding, then we will be able to create a harmonious society. This study provided the readers with a better understanding of the importance of proper use of words or terminologies in their proper context. It is because this research delved on the conceptual and analytical mechanisms of using language in order to give a systematic pattern of corrective thinking and application for word’s use. Aside from affirming the importance of language in connection with our contemporary activities, this research looked into a deeper realization on the workings of language. This realization originated from Wittgensteinian context of understanding. As affirmation for Wittgenstein, it is appropriate to say that to understand a word in its proper context is to understand the sentence. To understand a sentence is to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of technique. This signifies that understanding is to know how to do something; in the case of language, understanding language means knowing how to use it. The researcher realized that understanding the meaning of a word is not something private to the mental life of an individual, but something which exist out in the open, in the public domain. This means that understanding the meaning is objectively understandable by people. However, the researcher did not agree with Wittgenstein’s view that philosophy should stop once we clear the way of understanding how our language works. Instead, the researcher adheres to the fact that philosophy as enterprise is an undying process in search for truth. For the researcher, we do not stop philosophizing because our imaginations continue to desire progress in terms of creativity. Thus, he affirmed Gadamer in claiming that we should not hinder our philosophical endeavors by breaking it. Even if we can clear the confusions and misunderstanding of language, still our active minds cling to what is new in the field of learning things. This research led to the formulation of other theories which can be useful tool in understanding the complexities with regards to ourselves and our society as a whole. Henceforth, all the laborious efforts of this research and the regimented time invested in the writing of this work are meaningfully compensated. (shrink)

Critical notice of Images of Science by P. M. Churchland and C. A. Hooker.

Scrutiny (1932-1953) was one of the most important critical reviews of the last century. Its editors and contributors included F. R. Leavis, Q. D. Leavis, Denys Thompson, L. C. Knights, D. W. Harding, W. H. Mellers, H. A. Mason, among others. In recasting Scrutiny’s critique of mass culture by way of Alisdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue (1981), I hope to show that the Scrutiny project not only dramatizes the conflicts internal to what MacIntyre calls emotivist culture, but provides a new way (...) of looking at the group’s relation to the culture industry, its purported elitism, and its deep ties with a communitarian rather than socialist politics. (shrink)

Primarily using philosophy, but also some social science, Escape from Leviathan (EfL) explains and defends what it calls an extreme version of the implicit ‘classical liberal compatibility thesis’: liberty, welfare, and anarchy are overwhelmingly complementary in normal practice (rationality is added for its intimate theoretical connections to these categories). This is done using theories, not definitions, of each concept. This important thesis is entirely positive. Therefore, somewhat unusually, all normative issues are avoided as irrelevant distractions in this context. In addition, (...) the epistemology used is also unorthodox. A justificationist, or foundationalist, approach would be literally illogical: the self-refuting trilemma faced by ‘supporting justifications’ (as regards arguments and evidence) is of entailing infinite regresses, dogmatic starting points, or circularities. Consequently, critical rationalism is assumed: conjecture and criticism are all that is possible. Thus all aspects of the conjectured thesis are explained and defended from criticism as thoroughly as the book can encompass. It is concluded that the thesis has not been refuted and so may be critically preferred. (However, this could all still be viewed as a ‘justification’ by those thus inclined.) All of this is made clear enough in the short introductory chapter and repeated where relevant throughout. Yet some reviews do not have a firm grasp of the specific project and so reject it with unsound criticisms. We now turn to one such example. (shrink)

Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff have argued for a view they call the ‘theory theory’: theory change in science and children are similar. While their version of the theory theory has been criticized for depending on a number of disputed claims, we argue that there is a fundamental problem which is much more basic: the theory theory is multiply ambiguous. We show that it might be claiming that a similarity holds between theory change in children and (i) individual scientists, (...) (ii) a rational reconstruction of a Superscientist, or (iii) the scientific community. We argue that (i) is false, (ii) is non-empirical (which is problematic since the theory theory is supposed to be a bold empirical hypothesis), and (iii) is either false or doesn’t make enough sense to have a truth-value. We conclude that the theory theory is an interesting failure. Its failure points the way to a full, empirical picture of scientific development, one that marries a concern with the social dynamics of science to a psychological theory of scientific cognition. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals (human or nonhuman) to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible (...) with recognizing the inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

Hostile epistemology is the study of how environmental features exploit our cognitive vulnerabilities. I am particularly interested in those vulnerabilities arise from the basic character of our epistemic lives. We are finite beings with limited cognitive resources, perpetually forced to reasoning a rush. I focus on two sources of unavoidable vulnerability. First, we need to use cognitive shortcuts and heuristics to manage our limited time and attention. But hostile forces can always game the gap between the heuristic and the ideal. (...) Second, we need to trust others, and trust makes us vulnerable. In particular, we need to trust experts whose expertise lies beyond our individual ability to vet. So we must rely on various imperfect signals and proxies, like institutional affiliation, to manage our trust. We are forced to use these imperfect and exploitable forms of reasoning, in order to cope with a cognitively overwhelming world. I present the hostile epistemology framework as a counterbalance to vice epistemology, which tends to locate responsibility for bad beliefs in the character of the believer. I draw two conclusions from my analysis. First: suppose we accept that that only communities and institutions can know about the world. This deeply social approach doesn’t solve the problem of expert identification. The individual still faces a problem: given their incomplete understanding, how should the individual pick which group to trust? Second: we might have hoped to get some kind of static picture of the right principles of reasoning — but hostile epistemology presents a different picture. We have to use risky heuristics and shortcuts, which hostile forces can game and exploit. We can respond by shifting to a different set of heuristics, but this simply shifts the location of our vulnerabilities. These new heuristics are also exploitable. There is no end to this, only a constant struggle to adapt. Limited beings in a hostile epistemic environment are locked in an unending epistemic arms race. (shrink)

PUERPÉRIO EM BOVINOS -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- O puerpério é definido como o período entre o parto e a apresentação do primeiro estro fértil. Dois processos ocorrem durante o puerpério: a involução uterina e o início da atividade ovariana pós-parto. Em vacas leiteiras, os cuidados médicos pós-parto são essenciais nos programas de manejo, uma vez que as patologias uterinas são diagnosticadas e tratadas nesse período para que a vaca esteja em ótimas condições para ser inseminada, uma vez terminado o período de (...) espera voluntário. -/- 4.1 Involução uterina -/- O útero após o parto sofre modificações macroscópicas e microscópicas, até atingir as características de um útero não gestante, o que leva de 30 a 45 dias. O peso e o tamanho pós-parto diminuem rapidamente como consequência da atrofia das fibras musculares; por necrose das carúnculas e por eliminação de líquidos. Ao mesmo tempo em que o útero diminui de tamanho, o endométrio passa por um processo regenerativo para poder hospedar uma nova gestação. -/- A involução é promovida pelas contrações uterinas, que facilitam a eliminação de fluidos e dejetos e reduzem o tamanho do útero. As contrações são causadas pela secreção contínua de PGF2α, de origem uterina, e pela ocitocina secretada durante a amamentação. A PGF2α é secretada durante as primeiras 3 semanas pós-parto e seu envolvimento é considerado necessário para que a involução uterina ocorra normalmente. -/- Durante a involução uterina, as secreções conhecidas como lóquios, que são formadas por restos de membranas, carúnculas, fluidos fetais e sangue, são derramadas pela vagina. Essas secreções variam da cor vermelha ao marrom, têm consistência viscosa e são inodoras. A maioria dos lóquios é descartada durante os primeiros 15 dias após o parto e, em seguida, praticamente desaparece, exceto em casos de involução uterina anormal, quando o útero continua a derramar fluidos de consistência, cor e odor diferentes (figura 1). -/- Figura 1: O útero após o parto sofre alterações macroscópicas e microscópicas, até atingir as características de um útero não grávido, o que leva de 30 a 45 dias. -/- Antes do parto, o útero é estéril, pois é protegido da contaminação bacteriana pelo colo do útero ou cérvix. Durante e após o parto, essa barreira física desaparece e o útero é invadido por bactérias que se encontram no meio ambiente, pele e fezes, ou que são introduzidas durante a assistência ao parto. Além disso, a capacidade funcional dos fagócitos uterinos é baixa após o parto, o que contribui para o estabelecimento de infecções. Cerca de 95% das vacas desenvolvem infecções uterinas durante a involução, e uma alta porcentagem de vacas as eliminam por meio de mecanismos naturais. -/- Os mecanismos de defesa uterinos são constituídos pelas barreiras anatômicas (vagina, vulva e cérvix); fatores fisiológicos (produção de muco na vagina e cérvix); fagocitose promovida por neutrófilos, que migram da circulação geral para o útero; pela produção de substâncias inespecíficas, que inibem o crescimento bacteriano e favorecem a eliminação de microrganismos. A capacidade de eliminar bactérias do útero é determinada pelos hormônios ovarianos (progesterona e estrogênios); durante o diestro, a progesterona reduz a migração de neutrófilos, suprime o sistema imunocompetente, fecha o colo do útero e causa atonia uterina, resultando em aumento da suscetibilidade à infecção. Ao contrário, durante a fase folicular do ciclo estral (proestro e estro), o estradiol promove a migração de neutrófilos, abre a cérvix e aumenta o tônus uterino, o que facilita a eliminação de agentes infecciosos. Além disso, a atividade dos neutrófilos é afetada pelas deficiências antioxidantes e pela profundidade do balanço energético negativo. -/- 4.2 Anormalidades do puerpério -/- Após o parto, ocorrem algumas patologias que retardam a involução uterina e, consequentemente, afetam o intervalo entre o parto e o primeiro serviço. -/- 4.2.1 Retenção da placenta -/- A placenta é eliminada dentro de 12 horas após o parto; a retenção da placenta por mais de 24 horas é considerada uma patologia. A retenção placentária (RP) é uma alteração frequente do puerpério, que deve ser considerada como um sinal clínico de várias condições que podem ter origem infecciosa (aborto), metabólica (hipocalcemia, cetose, síndrome do vaca gorda), deficiências nutricionais (selênio e vitamina E) e erros de manejo (demasiada intervenção no parto). -/- A incidência de RP varia de 5 a 15% e depende, em grande parte, do estado de saúde e do manejo do rebanho. A RP é o principal fator de risco para infecções uterinas (metrite puerperal, metrite, endometrite e endometrite subclínica); também causa atraso no período entre o parto e a concepção e está associada à redução do percentual de concepção no primeiro serviço. -/- Em termos econômicos, determinou-se que a RP causa perdas significativas principalmente devido aos custos de serviços médicos, aumento da taxa de eliminação e diminuição da fecundidade. Além disso, vacas com retenção placentária produzem 355 kg a menos de leite durante os primeiros 60 dias do que vacas que não apresentam esta patologia (figuras 2 e 3). -/- 4.2.2 Patogenia -/- A placenta está ligada ao endométrio pelas vilosidades coriônicas, que estão ligadas às carúnculas (junção carúncula-cotilédone). A união entre essas estruturas é favorecida por um fluido adesivo formado por colágeno e outras proteínas. Antes e durante o trabalho de parto, observa-se um aumento da atividade das enzimas proteolíticas (colagenase, talvez a mais importante), que são responsáveis por separar o cotilédone da carúncula. Posteriormente, a placenta é removida mecanicamente por contrações uterinas após o parto do feto. -/- A etiologia e patogênese da retenção placentária não são conhecidas. Uma explicação proposta é que isso se deve a uma falha dos mecanismos proteolíticos responsáveis pela separação do cotilédone da carúncula. Foi observado que a atividade da colagenase no cotilédone é maior em vacas que não retêm placenta do que naquelas que a retêm. Propõe-se que alguns fatores de risco para retenção placentária possam estar atuando na redução da atividade da colagenase. Por outro lado, as condições inflamatórias na junção carúncula-cotilédone de origem infecciosa também impedem a separação da placenta. -/- Figura 3: Vaca com retenção placentária. -/- Figura 2: Vaca com retenção placentária. Em rebanhos comerciais, 5 a 15% das vacas retêm a placenta. -/- 4.2.3 Tratamento -/- Existem vários tratamentos, como a remoção manual da placenta em combinação com a aplicação local de antibióticos (infusões intrauterinas) e a administração de produtos hormonais (ocitócicos e PGF2α). A eficácia desses tratamentos é discutível. -/- A remoção manual da placenta é o tratamento mais popular; entretanto, não é a melhor, pois causa danos ao endométrio, que variam de leve sangramento a hematomas, mesmo quando não há evidências externas. Além disso, a remoção manual diminui a capacidade fagocítica dos leucócitos uterinos, resultando em metrite mais grave, maior atraso na involução uterina e baixo desempenho reprodutivo. -/- Outro tratamento consiste em cortar a placenta ao nível da vulva. Posteriormente, quando a placenta se separa das carúnculas, devido ao processo de decomposição do tecido, uma leve tração da vulva é suficiente para retirá-la, sem consequências. Essas vacas devem ser observadas quanto à febre e imediatamente integradas ao programa de check-up pós-parto, pois certamente desenvolverão metrite ou endometrite. A administração de antibióticos, tanto nos casos de retirada manual como naqueles em que a placenta é cortada, depende do estado geral da vaca. Deve-se sempre ter em mente que a RP é o principal fator de risco para metrite, portanto as vacas devem ser observadas para detectar prontamente aquelas que apresentam febre. Os antibióticos devem ser considerados para inibir a putrefação das membranas fetais, o que pode atrasar sua expulsão. No caso de opção pela administração de antibióticos, deve-se optar pela via parenteral em vez da intrauterina, pois esta causa irritação do endométrio, que está associada à baixa fertilidade (figura 4). -/- Outros tratamentos são baseados na administração de hormônios que estimulam a mobilidade uterina (ocitocina, estrogênios e PGF2α); entretanto, não há evidências clínicas que demonstrem sua eficácia; além disso, a causa menos frequente de RP é a incapacidade mecânica do útero de expelir a placenta. -/- 4.2.4 Prevenção -/- As estratégias de prevenção dessa patologia devem ter como objetivo reduzir a influência dos fatores de risco para RP. Assim, a incidência de abortos deve ser reduzida por meio de programas eficazes de vacinação e biossegurança; deve-se evitar períodos de seca muito longos para que as vacas não cheguem obesas ao parto; intervir o mínimo possível nos partos, e se atendido, deve ser feito com medidas de higiene rígidas; oferecer sais minerais de boa qualidade e administrar antioxidantes antes do parto (vitamina E, selênio e betacarotenos; tabela 1). -/- Figura 4: A placenta não deve ser removida inserindo a mão na vagina. É aconselhável aguardar a autólise (48 horas) e removê-la por leve tração. -/- Tabela 1: Incidência de retenção na membrana fetal (RMF), metrite hemorrágica (HM), metrite purulenta (PM) e puerpério anormal (PA) em vacas leiteiras tratadas com selênio e vitamina E nos dias 60, 21 antes do parto e 30, 90 pós-parto (grupo pré-pós-parto) e 21 dias pré-parto (grupo pré-parto) e testemunhas. -/- Laterais diferentes na mesma coluna indicam diferença estatística (P < 0,05). Adaptado de RUIZ et al., 2008. -/- 4.3 Infecções uterinas -/- Cerca de 95% das vacas desenvolvem infecção uterina durante os primeiros dias pós-parto; no entanto, a maioria elimina infecções por meio de seus mecanismos de defesa e apenas 30 a 50% delas desenvolvem metrite ou endometrite nas primeiras três semanas. As bactérias mais frequentes encontradas em processos inflamatórios no útero são: Arcanobacterium pyogenes (antes Actinomyces pyogenes), Fusobacterium necrophorum e Escherichia coli. Essas três bactérias agem sinergicamente. -/- 4.3.1 Metrite puerperal -/- A metrite puerperal é comum em vacas com retenção placentária. Essa patologia é observada nas três primeiras semanas pós-parto e é caracterizada pela presença de secreções abundantes na luz uterina que são vermelhas ou marrons, aquosas, fétidas e com involução retardada. As vacas afetadas mostram sinais de doença sistêmica (toxemia e febre > 39,5 °C) e diminuição da produção de leite (figura 5). -/- Figura 5: Vaca com metrite puerperal; vacas afetadas apresentam sinais de doença sistêmica. -/- 4.3.2 Metrite clínica -/- Metrite é o processo inflamatório que envolve as diferentes camadas do útero (mucosa, muscular e serosa). Esta condição se apresenta nos primeiros 21 dias pós-parto e é caracterizada por atraso na involução uterina e secreção purulenta, e não há sinais de doença sistêmica (figura 6). -/- 4.3.3 Endometrite clínica -/- Endometrite se refere à inflamação do revestimento uterino; clinicamente, caracteriza-se por retardo na involução uterina e eliminação de exsudato purulento ou mucopurulento. Pode surgir nos primeiros 21 dias pós-parto ou mais, sem apresentar qualquer afetação no estado geral. -/- Figura 6: Vaca com exsudato mucopurulento. Na prática, é difícil estabelecer um diagnóstico diferencial entre endometrite e metrite. Uma vaca com essa secreção pode ser tratada com cefalosporinas intrauterinas ou, se ela já estiver em ciclo, a administração de PGF2a é eficaz. -/- 4.3.4 Endometrite subclínica -/- Apresenta-se entre 21 e 40 dias pós-parto, não apresenta sinais externos e só é diagnosticada pela citologia uterina. Essa condição afeta entre 20 e 30% das vacas. Os fatores de risco identificados são retenção placentária e metrite. -/- 4.4 Diagnóstico -/- O diagnóstico é baseado na avaliação uterina por palpação retal, na qual são verificados o grau de involução e as características das secreções. Além disso, é necessária uma avaliação clínica geral, uma vez que vacas com metrite nos primeiros 10 dias pós-parto desenvolvem febre. Outra forma de estabelecer o diagnóstico é avaliando as secreções uterinas sem palpação retal. Pode ser feito introduzindo a mão por via vaginal, após a limpeza da região; embora este método possa parecer arriscado, a experiência em campo indica que é um método seguro e rápido. Outra possibilidade é por meio da vaginoscopia, esse método permite a avaliação da cérvix e das secreções uterinas. Existe um instrumento (Metricheck) que é inserido pela vagina e possui uma campânula atraumática na extremidade que permite a coleta das secreções uterinas (figuras 7 e 8). -/- 4.5 Impacto das infecções uterinas na reprodução e produção -/- As infecções uterinas (metrite e endometrite) prolongam o período do parto até a concepção; diminuem a porcentagem de concepção no primeiro serviço; a porcentagem de resíduos aumenta; a taxa de vacas inseminadas diminui e a produção diminui (300 kg a menos que vacas não afetadas). Além disso, eles afetam o período do parto à primeira ovulação; em vacas com puerpério anormal, os folículos dominantes são menores em diâmetro e produzem menos estradiol do que vacas saudáveis. Também uma proporção menor dos folículos da primeira onda ovula em comparação com as vacas com puerpério anormal. -/- A endometrite subclínica diminui a taxa de concepção no primeiro serviço e aumenta os dias abertos. Além disso, a metrite ou endometrite pode afetar os ovidutos e causar inchaço, obstrução e aderências (esse processo é mais frequente em vacas que recebem injeções de estrogênio). -/- Figura 8: Outra forma de diagnosticar infecções uterinas é por meio da introdução de um instrumento que possui em sua extremidade uma campânula atraumática que permite a coleta de secreções uterinas (Metricheck). -/- Figura 7: O diagnóstico de infecções uterinas pode ser estabelecido com a introdução da mão por via vaginal, após limpeza da região. -/- 4.6 Tratamentos -/- Para evitar o efeito negativo das infecções uterinas na eficiência reprodutiva, é necessário um diagnóstico e tratamento oportunos. Existem diversos tratamentos para a metrite ou endometrite, como o uso de antibióticos sistêmicos ou intrauterinos, infusões intrauterinas de antissépticos e a administração de hormônios. -/- 4.6.1 Antibióticos -/- Os tratamentos com antibióticos intrauterinos são usados há muitos anos e são uma opção, desde que alguns aspectos sejam considerados: que o útero é um ambiente anaeróbio; que há a presença de exsudatos e tecidos em decomposição e a existência de uma grande diversidade de bactérias, algumas das quais até produzem enzimas que inativam alguns antibióticos. -/- Como o útero é um ambiente anaeróbio, os antibióticos do grupo dos aminoglicosídeos não são ativos, pois precisam de oxigênio. Por outro lado, o acúmulo de exsudato purulento e restos de tecido no útero inibe a atividade das sulfonamidas. Os nitrofuranos são eficazes contra A pyogenes, somente quando doses extremamente altas são usadas; as doses usuais nunca atingem a concentração inibitória mínima no endométrio; além disso, não são ativos na presença de sangue ou exsudato purulento, são irritantes e estão associados a problemas de fertilidade. -/- A penicilina intrauterina ou parenteral é eficaz na cura de infecções entre os dias 25 e 30 após o parto; ou seja, quando for observada uma diminuição na diversidade de espécies bacterianas (menor probabilidade de que algumas bactérias produzam penicilinase) e predomina A pyogenes, que é sensível a este antibiótico. As formulações intrauterinas de cefalosporinas (cefapirina benzatina) são eficazes em vacas com endometrite entre os dias 15-20 pós-parto e não é necessário retirar o leite do mercado. -/- A tetraciclina é o antibiótico mais utilizado devido ao seu amplo espectro e por manter sua atividade nas condições do útero pós-parto; porém, a probabilidade de resistência bacteriana é alta devido ao seu uso contínuo por muitos anos, também causa danos ao endométrio e reduz a fertilidade (figura 9). -/- Em testes de campo, a administração de uma única infusão intrauterina de cefapirina benzatina, em vacas com endometrite entre os dias 15 a 20 pós-parto, produz uma maior taxa de recuperação e não afeta a fertilidade, em comparação com aquelas que foram tratadas com infusões de oxitetraciclina. -/- O problema mais importante na terapia com antibióticos é estabelecer um critério de quais animais realmente precisam. Nos casos de metrite puerperal não há dúvida, essas vacas precisam de tratamento com antibióticos por via sistêmica e intrauterina. Porém, em casos de metrite e endometrite a decisão é difícil, pois muitas vacas se curam sem nenhum tratamento. Na prática, antes que os antibióticos sejam administrados às vacas, deve-se considerar alguns dos fatores: características das secreções uterinas, dias após o parto, início da atividade ovariana, presença de febre e condição corporal. -/- Figura 9: As infusões de oxitetraciclina causam irritação do endométrio e diminuem a fertilidade. -/- 4.6.2 Tratamento com infusões de substâncias antissépticas -/- Tratamentos baseados na administração intrauterina de substâncias antissépticas também são usados. O tratamento mais frequente consiste na infusão de soluções de iodo; no entanto, os resultados com esta terapia não são positivos e estão associados a uma diminuição subsequente da fertilidade. Deve-se ter cautela no uso de antissépticos intrauterinos, pois todos causam irritação, afetam os mecanismos de defesa do útero e, em alguns casos, chegam a causar necrose do endométrio. -/- 4.6.3 Tratamentos hormonais -/- Na prática, a administração de estrogênio é comum em casos de metrite, principalmente quando o útero retém muito líquido. Sabe-se que os estrógenos em condições fisiológicas favorecem a contratilidade uterina e auxiliam na eliminação de infecções, porém, em doses farmacológicas o efeito é negativo. A administração de estrogênios pode contribuir para infecções que ascendem aos ovidutos e causam salpingite, aderências ovarianas e infertilidade. -/- A PGF2α desempenha um papel importante no parto e durante a involução uterina. Em vacas com puerpério normal, a duração dos níveis elevados de PGF2α está negativamente correlacionada com o tempo de involução uterina; portanto, quanto mais tempo duram os níveis elevados de PGF2α, menor é o tempo de involução uterina. Além disso, a administração de PGF2α a cada 12 horas, dos dias 3 a 10 pós-parto, encurta o período de involução uterina. Ao contrário, em vacas com puerpério anormal, foi observada uma correlação positiva entre as concentrações de PGF2α e o tempo de involução uterina; portanto, vacas com retenção placentária ou endometrite apresentam níveis mais elevados de PGF2α. -/- Algumas evidências envolvem a PGF2α como parte do mecanismo de eliminação da placenta; ou seja, foi observado que as vacas que normalmente eliminam a placenta apresentaram maiores concentrações de PGF2α na placenta, em comparação com as vacas com retenção placentária. Foi proposto que a falha do processo que leva à separação do cotilédone da carúncula está associada a uma alteração no metabolismo da prostaglandina, resultando em uma diminuição na PGF2α e um aumento na PGE2. Por outro lado, a inibição da síntese de PGF2α após o parto, por meio da injeção de ácido acetilsalicílico (aspirina), causa retenção da placenta. Esse conhecimento motivou estudos nos quais o tratamento com PGF2α após o parto foi avaliado para prevenir a retenção placentária ou reduzir o tempo de involução em vacas com retenção placentária ou metrite. Em alguns estudos, uma única injeção de PGF2α foi administrada nas primeiras horas após o parto com resultados conflitantes. Em outros estudos, a injeção de PGF2α entre os dias 20 a 30 pós-parto foi avaliada e não foi observado um efeito favorável na involução uterina. Porém, a injeção sistemática de PGF2α, a cada 14 dias a partir do 25º dia pós-parto, aumenta a proporção de vacas inseminadas, o que aumenta a taxa de prenhez. A PGF2α causa contrações uterinas e favorece a eliminação de secreções; entretanto, um efeito favorável da PGF2α na involução uterina, sem envolver um corpo lúteo, é questionável. -/- Na prática, um programa é usado com base na administração sistemática de PGF2α a todas as vacas a cada 14 dias, do 25º ao 30º dia pós-parto. Esse tratamento é baseado no encurtamento das fases lúteas, o que favorece a eliminação das infecções. Deve-se observar que cerca de 30% das vacas desenvolvem corpos lúteos longevos (21 a 50 dias) nos primeiros ciclos pós-parto, nessas condições a injeção de PGF2α, a cada 14 dias, encurta o ciclo estral e diminui o risco de persistência de infecções uterinas. -/- 4.7 Piometra -/- Esta patologia se desenvolve em vacas que ovulam nos primeiros 20 dias pós-parto e, concomitantemente, sofrem de infecção uterina. Nessas condições, a progesterona promove a proliferação bacteriana e fecha o colo do útero, causando acúmulo de exsudato purulento no útero. As alterações causadas no endométrio alteram a secreção de PGF2α, resultando na persistência do corpo lúteo e anestro. Vacas com piometra respondem muito bem ao tratamento com PGF2α; uma segunda injeção desse hormônio, 14 dias depois, encurta o período de recuperação (figura 10). -/- Figura 10: A piometra é caracterizada pelo acúmulo de exsudato purulento no útero, colo uterino fechado e presença de corpo lúteo. O diagnóstico é feito por palpação retal e tratado com PGF2α. -/- 4.8 Vaginite em fêmeas gestantes -/- A vaginite em fêmeas grávidas ocorre com baixa frequência; porém, quando há um caso, causa alarme porque é confundido com um aborto. Nesses casos, o veterinário deve fazer um exame retal para determinar se o produto está vivo e se a cérvix está aberta. O diagnóstico é concluído com o exame vaginal com vaginoscópio ou diretamente à mão com luva limpa. -/- No caso de um aborto, o produto geralmente está morto e a cérvix está aberta; nestes casos, o produto deve ser extraído. Ao contrário, se a cérvix estiver fechada e o feto estiver vivo, o prognóstico é favorável e o problema diminui com o tratamento com antibióticos sistêmicos. -/- RESUMO -/- < >O útero após o parto pesa 13 kg e no dia 21 pós-parto, 1 kg. A regeneração do epitélio uterino leva 25 dias. A regeneração das camadas profundas do endométrio leva 42 a 56 dias. 95% das vacas desenvolvem alguma infecção uterina. 30 a 50% das vacas desenvolvem metrite nas primeiras duas semanas após o parto. 15 a 20% persistem como endometrite clínica > 3 semanas após o parto. 18 a 20% têm metrite com efeitos sistêmicos. 20 a 30% das vacas têm endometrite subclínica. 5 a 15% das vacas retêm a placenta. 355 kg de leite são perdidos em vacas com retenção placentária. Em vacas que sofrem de puerpério anormal, a proporção de vacas prenhes é reduzida em 10 por cento no 90º dia pós-parto. No Reino Unido, 192 euros são gastos por cada vaca que tem um puerpério anormal. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- ANDREWS, Anthony H. et al. (Ed.). Bovine medicine: diseases and husbandry of cattle. John Wiley & Sons, 2008. -/- AZAWI, O. I. Postpartum uterine infection in cattle. Animal reproduction science, v. 105, n. 3-4, p. 187-208, 2008. -/- BEARDEN, Henry Joe et al. Applied animal reproduction. Reston Publishing Company, Inc., 1984. -/- HOLY, Lubos; MARTÍNEZ JÚSTIZ, G. Colab. Biología de la reproducción bovina. Havana: Revolucionária, 1975. -/- HOPPER, Richard M. (Ed.). Bovine reproduction. John Wiley & Sons, 2014. -/- HORTA, António Eduardo Monteiro. Fisiologia do puerpério na vaca. Jornada Internales de Reproductión Animal, v. 8, p. 73-84, 1995. -/- KOZICKI, Luiz Ernandes. Aspectos fisiológicos e patológicos do puerpério em bovinos. Archives of Veterinary Science, v. 3, n. 1, 1998. -/- LEBLANC, S. J. et al. Defining and diagnosing postpartum clinical endometritis and its impact on reproductive performance in dairy cows. Journal of dairy science, v. 85, n. 9, p. 2223-2236, 2002. -/- LEBLANC, S. J. et al. The effect of treatment of clinical endometritis on reproductive performance in dairy cows. Journal of dairy science, v. 85, n. 9, p. 2237-2249, 2002. -/- MARTINS, T. M.; BORGES, A. M. Avaliação uterina em vacas durante o puerpério. Rev. Bras. Reprod. Anim, Belo Horizonte, v. 35, n. 4, p. 433-443, 2011. -/- RADOSTITS, Otto M. et al. Clínica Veterinária: um tratado de doenças dos bovinos, ovinos, suínos, caprinos e eqüinos. Rio de Janeiro: Guanabara Koogan, 2002. -/- RISCO, CARLOS A.; YOUNGQUIST, ROBERT S.; SHORE, M. DAWN. Postpartum uterine infections. In: Current therapy in large animal theriogenology. WB Saunders, 2007. p. 339-344. -/- SHELDON, I. M. et al. Influence of uterine bacterial contamination after parturition on ovarian dominant follicle selection and follicle growth and function in cattle. REPRODUCTION-CAMBRIDGE-, v. 123, n. 6, p. 837-845, 2002. -/- SHELDON, I. M. et al. Mechanisms of infertility associated with clinical and subclinical endometritis in high producing dairy cattle. Reproduction in domestic animals, v. 44, p. 1-9, 2009. -/- SHELDON, I. Martin et al. Uterine diseases in cattle after parturition. The Veterinary Journal, v. 176, n. 1, p. 115-121, 2008. -/- TIXI, C. et al. Factores que afectan el porcentaje de vacas gestantes en el día 90 posparto. In: Memorias del XXXIII Congreso Nacional de Buiatría. Tuxtla Gutiérrez Chiapas. México. pp. 2009. (shrink)

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. (...) I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

Architecture and Deconstruction Case of Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi -/- Introduction Towards deconstruction in architecture Intensive relations between philosophical deconstruction and architecture, which were present in the late 1980s and early 1990s, belong to the past and therefore may be described from a greater than before distance. Within these relations three basic variations can be distinguished: the first one, in which philosophy of deconstruction deals with architectural terms but does not interfere with real architecture, the second one, in which (...) a collaboration between Jacques Derrida and a group of architects interested in his concepts is commenced, and the third one, in which completed or only designed objects or new concepts of deconstruction created by architects gain their supremacy over philosophy. The following book analyses these three possible ways, first of all with the reference to Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi. -/- Peter Eisenman -/- Misreading… and Other Errors -/- The issue of relations between Peter Eisenman’s work and philosophy of deconstruction may be referred to his activity more than ten years preceding his direct collaboration with Jacques Derrida (in 1985) and organisation of the exhibition Deconstructivist Architecture at Museum of Modern Art in New York (in 1988). As soon as at the stage of designing the first houses (House I-III, 1967-1970), which almost entirely inscribed in formalistic aesthetics of Modernism, the architect analysed the problem of architecture dependence on its assumptions. All his later designs may be treated as consequence of this initial interest in relations between practice and theory, and at the same time as an introduction to manipulations later on led at the level of metaphysics of architecture. Beginning with the issue of presence, considered in comments to House VI (1972), the number of ideas having their analogies in philosophy of deconstruction increased. The text entitled The End of the Classical: The End of the Beginning, The End of the End (1984), in which Eisenman criticised questions of representation in architecture, its delusive strive for truth and comparably unattainable attempts at ultimate definition of elementary rules, should be acclaimed the breaking point. This attitude was extended by numerous strategies disturbing architecture rules defined at metaphysical level in an essay Moving Arrows, Eros, and Other Errors: an Architecture of Absence (1986). The issue of Eisenman’s passage from formalism to deconstruction has already been much discussed in the literature (Rosalind Krauss, Thomas Patin among others), still it should be mentioned that the threads similar to Derrida’s concept included in Eisenman’s writing reveal untranslatability of architecture and philosophy. -/- Choral Works or Separate tricks -/- In 1985-1986 a series of seven disputes between Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman took place. The pretext for them were designs concerning Parc de la Villette in Paris. The situation of many months of collaboration between a notable philosopher of the second half of the 20th c. and an architect that already had a huge theoretical oeuvre, ended up with a publication of a large volume entitled Chora L Works and it became at the same time a vast study area for historians of contemporary architecture and philosophers. Derrida’s contribution to concept works were his considerations over the idea of chôra, the properties related to this concept were about to be reflected in shapes of the park. Therefore, Chora L Works became an example of the abilities of contemporary art, both in its capability of translation from philosophical ideas to artistic forms and its resistance to tradition of representing in architecture some phenomena and values originating outside this discipline. In the final period of their collaboration both interlocutors started to polemicise with each other more decidedly, what became a separate part of their thought exchange. The exchange of letters between Derrida and Eisenman at the turn of 1989 ended up the period of their direct contacts, nevertheless, at this time precisely a large group of experts in issues of deconstruction joined the discussion and extended the revealed in the former dispute problems into more than ten years of further considerations and publications. Except for a long text by Jeffrey Kipnis, who had participated in the meetings of the philosopher and the architect, there appeared also comments of researchers of artistic theories (K. Michael Hays, Thomas Patin), philosophers (Andrew Benjamin), and even experts in Greek literature (Maria Theodorou or Ann Bergren). Following these debates a contemporary reflection on architecture has saturated with indeed numerous concepts originating in philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Architecture which imitates mute philosophy -/- The series of Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman meetings, which took place in the period of 1985-1987, induced many authors to make comments. Some of them (Jeffrey Kipnis, Ann Bergren, Maria Theodorou) developed the subject of chôra which was introduced to the discussion by Derrida. The problem that was about to be solved was the question of tying up the concept of chôra with architecture, including Eisenman’s architecture and the series of meetings within frames of Chora L Works project. Kipnis on this occasion paid attention to chôra and its character of anachronia which infects any being created within chôra. In other words any event has its counterpart (analogon) in another, earlier event. He demonstrated the similarity of structure of many events and statements from the times of Derrida and Eisenman’s meetings to the almost identical behaviour of figures in Plato’s dialogue Timaeus. The loss of beginning present in this phenomenon was appropriate to both features of chôra and the effects of typical analyses of philosophy of deconstruction. Bergren’s analyses focused on accentuating gender of chôra, which, according to this author, had been neglected hitherto in discussions. She collated chôra descriptions with characteristics of women in myths, early Greek epic and philosophy and she arrived at a conclusion that chôra has features of a single woman and a married one at the same time. And yet Theodorou’s studies showed that in the Homeric epics chôra is not treated as an idea but is related with single things and events. The other part of the comments (represented by Andrew Benjamin and K. Michael Hays’ utterances) concerns Eisenman’s attitude to tradition which was treated as a variety of iteration understood philosophically. Benjamin commenced his considerations at the point of closeness between a definition of tradition and a concept of chôra understood as perpetuation (placement). A problematic issue was for him Eisenman’s complex relation to tradition based on its contest and affirmation at the same time. Overcoming the simple subordination to tradition – according to Benjamin – was based on awareness of the role of repetition in culture not known before. Hays made an attempt to explain the pleasure and torment of repetition with the support of Sigmund Freud and Roland Barthes’ concepts. According to Hays repetitions are attempts of a single being to a certain primal state perceived as free of any tension. In a similar way Rosalind Krauss explained a motif of a grate present in Modernistic art and also exceptionally frequent in Eisenman’s work. -/- Annex Architecture is still writing Balzac novels. Peter Eisenman and literature -/- Architecture’s approach to writing, script or literature, present within Peter Eisenman’s work, is an exceptional phenomenon, furthermore a complex one. The article considers four possible relations. The first one relates to Eisenman’s characteristics as a person extremely gifted with the ability to wordplay, which very ‘play’ reveals skills to create architectural images. In the second approach the attention has been paid to Eisenman’s interests – in the first period of his oeuvre – in linguistic works by Noam Chomsky and his transformational-generative grammar. The third kind of relations applied to overcoming the need for autonomy of architecture (and of modernist aesthetics at the same time) and renew interests in questions of meaning in architecture. The fourth sort of relations occurred when Eisenman started to create reflections of historic or literary narrations in architecture – ‘stone stories’ and architectural fictions of their kind. -/- Bernard Tschumi -/- From perversion to deconstruction In Bernard Tschumi’s writings from the 1970s and 1980s we can find a transposition of important threads of post-structuralist ideas deriving from Georges Bataille, Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida’s works. The analysis of the architect’s writings also shows roots in Phillippe Sollers, Michel Foucault and Denis Hollier’s works. The analysis of borrowed elements from the beginnings of Tschumi’s theoretical activity may be helpful in explaining the contents of his later writings motre inspired by philosophy of deconstruction. The set of his earliest views was inspired by Marxism, Neo Marxism and French Structuralism, mainly by the writings of Henri Levebre and Guy Debord. From the thought of Levebre Tschumi took interest for city as not only a question of urbanistics but also a political issue. From Debord’s concepts he borrowed a conviction about the role of situational violation for changes in the society structure. Some of these beliefs were preserved in his own concepts of architecture as an event. From this period derived also his will to change conservative elements of social structure not by means of political revolution but of theoretical and creative activity. Tschumi acknowledged that the effective way of the proceedings towards achieving his aims would be accepting the role of both a critical intellectualist and architecture expert who would not hide away his left-wing orientation. The speculations defined by the architect as ‘revolting analyses’ were about to characterise contradictions which tear the society apart, penetrate architecture and constitute the basis of culture. Spreading away of the conscience of false assumptions hidden away in various disciplines could have weakened cohesion of a conservative society and influence the will to change among the elites. This way the beginnings of political revolution were rooted in philosophy of architecture. In 1977 Tschumi published his text entitled The Pleasure of Architecture inspired by Roland Barthes’s The Pleasure of the Text, it also included some concepts derived from Georges Bataille and Jacques Derrida. First of all the author used Barthes’s concept which made an assumption that literary activity is pervaded by the spirit of resistance towards social rules, and Tschudi transferred this remark onto architecture. From the ideas of Bataille, acquainted via Holier’s work, he derived his belief that two concepts of space, a conceptual one (defined as Pyramid) and a sensual one (defined as Labirynth), not losing their distinct features, they join in the concept of experienced space which exceeds contradictions. The exceeding itself was defined as the basic rule of architecture and it was referred to situations in which architecture not only negates social needs, but also disavows its own tradition. Crossing the borders applies not only to political issues or permanent rules of the very discipline but also interfering with other fields (especially literature and film). The fact that architecture is associated with organising events turned Tschumi’s attention to questions of violence that result from upsetting architectural order of a given building by its users and the one hand, and on the other from forcing the users to specific acts imposed by this very order. The analysis of the concepts used by Tschumi in his early writings indicates that they are close to definitions that would occur in his reflection in the following years influenced by philosophy of deconstruction. -/- Approaching deconstruction Tschumi in his theories developed in the 1980s presumed that the current social world had undergone a deep process of decay, and the reaction against which ought to be based on ordering-up actions, and also preserving the main outline of disintegration of the whole and its elements in the state of conflict. The statements concerning the nature of the contemporary to Tschumi social relations were applied by him to the world of architecture, this led him to coming up with designing strategies that took into consideration the destabilised character of conditions in which works of architecture were created. New ways of conduct invented by Tschumi drew their inspiration from literature and research on literature, psychoanalysis, structural linguistics, structuralism and post structuralism, and eventually also deconstruction philosophy. The proposed methods were opposed by their author both to functionalism continuity trends and postmodern architecture. Tschumi’s proposals contradicted any forms of conservatism or traditionalism in political sphere as well as in reference to tendencies in architecture. They were not simple contradictions of social or architectural rules, they intrude them from the inside, weaken or escalate the already existing incongruities, they move the boundaries between the areas. Revolutionary illusions about the possibility of radical changes were replaced with strategies which completed, tainted or test former rules in the series of formal games of permutation and combination. Quite different from avant-garde formalism Tschumi’s games were not about maintaining the autonomy of a given area, but on the contrary – polluting it with other areas’ influences. Tschumi enjoyed demonstrating illusions of architecture concerning simple relations between form and function, or between form and meaning. Making use of Freud, Lacan and Foucault’s research he introduced a category of “madness” into architecture allowing an observation that the recognised norms are nothing but merely ones of many possible principles of behaviour, and their recognised status resulted from unjustified hindering innovativeness which is crucial for architecture. To reborn architecture’s capability of changing Tschumi also made use of Barthes’s discoveries concerning rules of narration and works by writers who applied in their writing knowledge on linguistics. Making a work’s author unclear by various mechanical transformations of its elements was however apparent only, and formal rigours imposed on the process of designing liberated possibilities difficult to obtain in more traditional creative action. Another mode of acting introduced by Tschumi was combining his work of elements deriving from outside architecture; joining space records with notation of motion and events accompanying architectural objects among others. These architectural and extra-architectural elements were not unified, on the contrary their heterogenous and conflictual character was stressed. This is how shock, anxiety and instability, typical for live in great metropolises, infiltrated architecture. Taking some ideas of deconstruction philosophy as a pattern Tschumi also took into critical consideration in his essays traditional in architecture oppositions between form and figuration, or theory and practice. By combining various inspirations he eventually worked out an idea of architectural event, which he understood as a series of actions contesting its own field, redefining its sources, principles and elements. An event, understood in this way, was not so much producing works as rather creating conditions of their production and at the same time designing the society different from a hierarchic one. -/- Park of deconstruction Among numerous philosophical strategies of deconstruction most frequently used was questioning the practice of strong opposition of two reasons. In many cases Bernard Tschumi’s writings just consider functioning of the conflict juxtaposition of the ideas of structure and ornament or theory and practice in history of architecture. Violation of traditional relations between terms of this kind, both old and modern, raised Jacques Derrida’s objections, when he was induced for the first time to co-operate with architects’ milieu. During this long lasting thought exchange the philosopher eventually acknowledged Bernard Tschumi’s arguments for reasoning the encroachment of architecture’s fundamental rules. Deconstruction applied in architecture was not a simple transposition or analogy of practices that had been applied by philosophy of deconstruction. We may even say that considering architectural terms became an important formula of deconstruction. Architecture understood in philosophical way became something beyond the practice and theory of its own discipline, a sort of metaphysics of both philosophy and architecture. The deliberate encroachment of simplicity of dividing architecture into theory and practice, for the first time became a clear aim for Tschumi in his drawings and texts entitled The Manhattan Transcripts. The contents of this series of works was a record of characteristic features of this New York district in such a way that not only objects were the subject of the record but also relations between objects, people and events. The record was about to take into consideration a conflict character of elements of this representation and at the same time to avoid applying to them the rule of mimetism. The record became a form of reflection over the very record by an increased control over the ways of representation. Architecture which was considered in the The Manhattan Transcripts was not directed to fulfill the needs of inhabitation or production, it was rather related with hitherto usually marginalised liminal situations: building ostentatiously big monuments, religious cult, war etc. Architecture operating in these relations focused also the attention on the included in it continuous tendency to overpass its own restrictions, the role of violence as its not recognised factor, or the meaning of excess and shock in its operation. Architecture moving from reason towards madness became even more visible in the design of Parisian Parc de la Villette, whose pavilions were defined as folies (in French it means both small park buildings and follies). The park was supposed to be on the one hand a reflection of traditional society disintegration while on the other it questioned basic rules of producing a work of architecture. The traditional rules of designing, based on ordering up, were replaced with the strategies of dysfunction and dissociation. In Tschumi’s opinion methods of this kind may be equivalent of what Derrida named différance. Instead of aiming at mergence, any diversity, plays or variations were strengthen. Tschumi’s texts, in which he explained his attitude, were completed by Derrida’s extent statement entitled Point de folie – Maintenant l’architecture. Derrida’s article is the most significant of all his statements on architecture as a form of thinking and activity. According to the philosopher, architecture should divide space (in French defined as espacement), what enables both thinking and action – it arranges the space of an event. Tschumi’s buildings, defined as folies, in an essential way destabilise any created order, and at the same time they refresh it. Derrida’s statement suggests that architecture may become both metaphor of an order merging a language or a society but also of inner forces which deconstruct and reconstruct it. Therefore architecture is at the same time a construction, a deconstruction and a reconstruction. Parc de la Villette stands out in this system with its attempt to step beyond the scheme of an easy repetition and its heading for chances of achieving more radical otherness. -/- Conclusion Destruction as construction. Paradoxes of deconstruction in architecture -/- Scepticism about persistence and common importance of fundamental values of human culture evinced in philosophers and writers’ works as early as in Greek antiquity, nevertheless it was not expressed so strongly as in the second half of the 20th century. Especially in Heidegger’s work Being and Time (although originated in 1927, still influential in all later philosophy) the following states were characterised: the state of losing the ground (Abgrund), of being out of sight (Unheimlichkeit) and of being out of dwelling (Un-zuhause-sein) – as the basis of self-confidence of conscious being there (Dasein). The entire criticism of philosophy of home and dwelling draws the inspiration from this early writing of the German philosopher, it combines crisis of basic terms of metaphysics with social conditions which are dictated by living in large metropolis. The crisis of both metaphysical foundation and home appears to be similar to the situation of weakening the relations between a man and his dwelling in extensively expanding cities. Whereas philosophy, as well as many disciplines of social sciences, have diagnosed for a long time the destabilisation of fundamental ideas of Western culture and crucial changes in the ways of dwelling, architecture itself occurred to be “the last fortress of metaphysics” (J. Derrida). Among contemporary architects, Peter Eisenman and Bernard Tschumi were the ones who engaged most decidedly in the issues of critical analysis of architecture foundation and its social role. Both the architects noticed new formulas of contemporary social and individual existence, tremendously different from the entire history, and at the same time they affirmed lack of adequacy of architecture concepts to new situations. Both Eisenman and Tschumi used to describe the existing architecture as a tool for consolidation of highly integrated and hierarchised societies, and also as a discipline extremely uncoincidental with the current character of social life based on ideas of freedom and diversity. The means to transform architecture and make a factor of further social changes out of it, was a concept that accentuated revealing the inner contradictions of this discipline, and considering them in designing strategies. Eisenman’s activity, in regard of what has just been noticed, was focused on questioning the basic rules of traditionally comprehended architecture, especially the rule of purpose. The American architect noticed that the concept of architecture as fulfilment the need of location, hides away the fact that the location has to be constantly reconsidered, and hence it is overtaken by change (dislocation). Therefore new concept of architecture propounded architectural activity to translocate the concept of location – more than before – but also to change its status perpetually. Such comprehended architecture should claim, as its main purpose, the constant revision of this purpose and create itself anew permanently. Even Eisenman’s earliest designs of houses nos. I-IV broke with such values as the sense of safety, closeness and familiarity, and just on the contrary they accentuated senses of strangeness, homelessness and loss of confidence. The contradictions within architecture noticed by Tschumi referred to combination of intellectual and sensual values in architecture, when their non-appropriation was defeated by an additional condition, namely the way of experience based on pleasure of excess, marked by insanity. The features of folly were especially visible in his designs of gardens, where the order of planning was mixed with sensual experience introduced by particular elements (both the ones created by nature, and the buildings defined as folies). Parc de la Villette designed by the French architect in Paris put in question not only the common understanding of purpose in architecture but also the ideas of order and integrity, as its plan was based on the combination of independent layers with records of grids of points, various lines and planes. The architecture that collides inadequate elements with each other was supposed to be a kind of an event with no beginning and no end. The architecture treated as an event became a form of a space weakened articulation that maintains its diversity and lack of accordance of the elements building it up. The analyses of Eisenman and Tschumi’s theoretical writings indicate how much the aims of architecture have actually changed; instead of supporting social persistence, the architecture is rather intensifying contradictions, and instead of providing people with the sense of safety, it sublimes danger. From simple acts of defamiliarisation, increasing the distance to itself and enhancing the role of theory, through discomfort, anxiety, not feeling someone at home, weirdness, excess, shock and violence, architecture reached the edge of stability and uncertainty, only to make an attempt at penetrating what is impossible and unutterable, and recording what cannot become the subject of any records. -/- . (shrink)

Because obituaries are succinct and explicitly intended to summarize their subjects’ lives, they may be expected to include only the features that the author finds most salient but also to signal to others in the community the socially-recognized aspects of the deceased’s character. We begin by reviewing studies 1 and 2, in which obituaries were carefully read and labeled. We then report study 3, which further develops these results with a semi-automated, large-scale semantic analysis of several thousand obituaries. Geography, gender, (...) and elite status all turn out to be associated with the virtues and values associated with the deceased. (shrink)

Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI; S. O. Lilienfeld, 1990; S. O. Lilienfeld & B. P. Andrews, 1996) with a community sample has suggested that the PPI subscales may comprise 2 higher order factors (S. D. Benning, C. J. Patrick, B. M. Hicks, D. M. Blonigen, & R. F. Krueger, 2003). However, substantive and structural evidence raises concerns about the viability of this 2-factor model, particularly in offender populations. The authors attempted to replicate the S. D. (...) Benning et al. 2-factor solution using a large (N= 1,224) incarcerated male sample. Confirmatory factor analysis of this model resulted in poor model fit. Similarly, using the same EFA procedures as did S. D. Benning et al., the authors found little evidence for a 2-factor model. When they followed the recommendations of J.-W. van Prooijen and W. A. van der Kloot (2001) for recovering EFA solutions, model fit results provided some evidence that a 3-factor EFA solution could be recovered via confirmatory factor analysis. (shrink)

What is the value of intellectual playfulness? Traditional characterizations of the ideal thinker often leave out playfulness; the ideal inquirer is supposed to be sober, careful, and conscientiousness. But elsewhere we find another ideal: the laughing sage, the playful thinker. These are models of intellectual playfulness. Intellectual playfulness, I suggest, is the disposition to try out alternate belief systems for fun – to try on radically different perspectives for the sheer pleasure of it. But what would the cog-nitive value be (...) of such playfulness? I suggest that intellectual playfulness function as, at the very least, a kind of intellectual insurance policy against epistemic traps. An epistemic trap is a belief system that re-directs good-faith inquiry to bad results. Am epistemic trap manipulates background beliefs to fend off contrary evidence. For example, a conspiracy theory might include a set of beliefs about how the mainstream media has been taken over by some vicious cabal. Normal epistemic attempts will be captured by a well-wrought epistemic trap, because normal attempts at inquiry are guided by these background beliefs -- which set what counts as a plausible path to explore, and what is implausible or beyond the pale. And a clever epistemic trap will manipulate those background beliefs for ill effect. Intellectual playfulness, on the other hand, isn’t motivated by an epistemic interest in the truth, but in the sheer pleasure of intellectual exploration. Since intellectual playfulness isn’t oriented towards the truth, it won’t be constrained by an agent’s background beliefs – it won’t, for example, prefer to investigate apparently more plausible pathways. Intellectual playfulness offers an opportunity to escape from epistemic traps. But intellectual playfulness has its own limitations. It will only drive us to explore belief systems when that exploration is fun. What we need is an array of differently-motivated exploratory tendencies – empathy, curiosity, playfulness – each of which will each cover for the others’ limitations. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts denying that temporal passage is an objective feature of reality face an explanatory challenge with respect to why it appears to us as though time passes. Recently, two solutions have surfaced. Cognitive illusionism claims that people experience the passage of time due to their belief that time passes. Cognitive error theory claims that we do not experience the passage of time, but hold the belief that we do, which we have acquired through making an inference from the prior (...) belief that time passes. These approaches suppose that belief and passage experience are explanatorily connected, and they depend on the claims that people who experience the passage of time or at least believe that they do also believe that time passes. To test these claims, we probed the beliefs of populations of individuals with depression and schizotypy, thus conditions that are strongly associated with alterations in temporal phenomenology. Depression was assessed with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and schizotypy with the short Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-LIFE). While cognitive illusionism and inferentialist cognitive error theory would predict a strong association between BDI and O-LIFE scores and beliefs about time passage, our study found no such association. The experience of passage does not seem to be explanatorily connected to beliefs about the passage of time. (shrink)

Tato studie je recenzní statí ke knize Andrew MCGETTIGAN, The Great University Gamble: Money, Markets and the Future of Higher Education. London: Pluto Press, 2013. Klíčovým motivem studie je využití McGettiganovy analýzy technických aspektů reformy univerzitního systému započaté v Anglii na konci první dekády jednadvacátého století pro výklad vzestupu specifického režimu vzdělávání vyjádřeného v jazyce a logice „trhu a peněz". Vzestup tohoto režimu je interpretován s ohledem na procesy odpojování univerzitního prostředí od dosavadního vzdělávacího rámce spojeného s veřejnými zájmy. (...) Studium způsobů, jakými procházejí peníze zaváděným systémem vzdělávání, odkrývá novou podobu konfrontace klasických ideálů univerzitní výchovy s realitou masového vzdělávání. (shrink)

Many philosophers have thought that our folk, or pre-reflective, view of persistence is one on which objects endure. This assumption not only plays a role in disputes about the nature of persistence itself, but is also put to use in several other areas of metaphysics, including debates about the nature of change and temporal passage. In this paper, we empirically test three broad claims. First, that most people (i.e. most non-philosophers) believe that, and it seems to them as though, objects (...) persist by enduring rather than perduring. Second, that most people have a view of change on which enduring but not perduring objects count as changing. Third, that one reason why the folk represent time as dynamical is because it seems to them, and they believe that, they endure through time. We found no evidence to support these claims. While there are certainly plenty of ‘folk’ endurantists in the population we tested, there are also plenty of ‘folk’ perdurantists. We did not find robust evidence that a majority of people believed that, or it seemed to them as though, objects endure rather than perdure. We conclude that many arguments in favour of endurantism that appeal to folk beliefs about, or experiences of, persisting objects and change rest on views about those beliefs and experiences that are empirically unsupported. There is no evidence to suggest that endurantism is the folk friendly view of persistence, and so we should stop treating it as such without argument. (shrink)

This is an anthology of ?fteen papers concerning various philosophical problems related to the topic of self-knowledge. All but one of the papers were previously unpublished, and all but two are descendants of presentations at a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St Andrews in 1995. The collection.

Eliminative reasoning is a method that has been employed in many significant episodes in the history of science. It has also been advocated by some philosophers as an important means for justifying well-established scientific theories. Arguments for how eliminative reasoning is able to do so, however, have generally relied on a too narrow conception of evidence, and have therefore tended to lapse into merely heuristic or pragmatic justifications for their conclusions. This paper shows how a broader conception of evidence not (...) only can supply the needed justification but also illuminates the methodological significance of eliminative reasoning in a variety of contexts. (shrink)

Because factory-farmed meat production inflicts gratuitous suffering upon animals and wreaks havoc on the environment, there are morally compelling reasons to become vegetarian. Yet industrial plant agriculture causes the death of many field animals, and this leads some to question whether consumers ought to get some of their protein from certain kinds of non factory-farmed meat. Donald Bruckner, for instance, boldly argues that the harm principle implies an obligation to collect and consume roadkill and that strict vegetarianism is thus immoral. (...) But this argument works only if the following claims are true: all humans have access to roadkill, roadkill would go to waste if those who happen upon it don’t themselves consume it, it’s impossible to harvest vegetables without killing animals, the animals who are killed in plant production are all-things-considered harmed by crop farming, and the best arguments for vegetarianism all endorse the harm principle. As I will argue in this paper, each claim is deeply problematic. Consequently, in most cases, humans ought to strictly eat plants and save the roadkill for cats. (shrink)

In Big Gods, Norenzayan (2013) presents the most comprehensive treatment yet of the Big Gods question. The book is a commendable attempt to synthesize the rapidly growing body of survey and experimental research on prosocial effects of religious primes together with cross-cultural data on the distribution of Big Gods. There are, however, a number of problems with the current cross-cultural evidence that weaken support for a causal link between big societies and certain types of Big Gods. Here we attempt to (...) clarify these problems and, in so doing, correct any potential misinterpretation of the cross-cultural findings, provide new insight into the processes generating the patterns observed, and flag directions for future research. (shrink)

Visual imagery is a form of sensory imagination, involving subjective experiences typically described as similar to perception, but which occur in the absence of corresponding external stimuli. We used the Activation Likelihood Estimation algorithm (ALE) to identify regions consistently activated by visual imagery across 40 neuroimaging studies, the first such meta-analysis. We also employed a recently developed multi-modal parcellation of the human brain to attribute stereotactic co-ordinates to one of 180 anatomical regions, the first time this approach has been combined (...) with the ALE algorithm. We identified a total 634 foci, based on measurements from 464 participants. Our overall comparison identified activation in the superior parietal lobule, particularly in the left hemisphere, consistent with the proposed ‘top-down’ role for this brain region in imagery. Inferior premotor areas and the inferior frontal sulcus were reliably activated, a finding consistent with the prominent semantic demands made by many visual imagery tasks. We observed bilateral activation in several areas associated with the integration of eye movements and visual information, including the supplementary and cingulate eye fields (SCEFs) and the frontal eye fields (FEFs), suggesting that enactive processes are important in visual imagery. V1 was typically activated during visual imagery, even when participants have their eyes closed, consistent with influential depictive theories of visual imagery. Temporal lobe activation was restricted to area PH and regions of the fusiform gyrus, adjacent to the fusiform face complex (FFC). These results provide a secure foundation for future work to characterise in greater detail the functional contributions of specific areas to visual imagery. (shrink)

Many philosophers have appealed to the PSR in arguments for a being that exists a se, a being whose explanation is in itself. But what does it mean, exactly, for something to have its explanation ‘in itself’? Contemporary philosophers have said next to nothing about this, relying instead on phrases plucked from the accounts of various historical figures. In this article, I analyse five such accounts – those of Anselm, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz – and argue that none are (...) satisfactory. Should we abandon or restrict the PSR, then? I think that would be hasty, for many reasons. I therefore consider the prospects of explaining everything, including God, given the constraints of certain features of good explanations, and conclude with several observations about future approaches. (shrink)

Given the endowment effect, the role of attention in decision-making, and the framing effect, most behavioral economists agree that it would be a mistake to accept the satisfaction of revealed preferences as the normative criterion of choice. Some have suggested that what makes agents better off is not the satisfaction of revealed preferences, but ‘true’ preferences, which may not always be observed through choice. While such preferences may appear to be an improvement over revealed preferences, some philosophers of economics have (...) argued that they face insurmountable epistemological, normative, and methodological challenges. This article introduces a new kind of true preference – values-based preferences – that blunts these challenges. Agents express values-based preferences when they choose in a manner that is compatible with a consumption plan grounded in a value commitment that is normative, affective, and stable for the agent who has one. Agents who choose according to their plans are resolute choosers. My claim is that while values-based preferences do not apply to every choice situation, this kind of preference provides a rigorous way for thinking about classic choice situations that have long interested behavioral economists and philosophers of economics, such as ‘Joe-in-the-cafeteria.’. (shrink)